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1 Introduction
Even though economists have tried to understand the determinants of business cycles
in an attempt to attenuate fluctuations, they are still around. Firms will inevitably
need to adjust their input factors in response to changes in the demand throughout
the business cycle. Therefore, rigidities in factor input adjustment are of the greatest
importance both at microeconomic and macroeconomic levels (Hamermesh and Pfann
(1996)). At the microeconomic level, the dynamics of labor adjustment allow for optimal
labor market policy design. Only if elasticities of factor demand relatively to shocks are
known can the government predict the market response and thus decide on the optimal
policy to implement. At the macroeconomic level, rigidities in factor markets partly
determine the speed and depth of factor adjustment throughout the business cycle and,
consequently, the dynamics of investment, employment and output. Although rigid
labor legislation contributes actively to decrease cyclical fluctuations in supply, it also
prevents a rapid adjustment from peaks or troughs towards the smoothed path. And
since the demand side of the economy is generally less rigid, short run discrepancies
between supply and demand will be harder to accommodate the more stringent labor
legislation is. The effects of the often-called eurosclerosis2 have been well documented.
Countries with over protectionist labor legislation, which imposes costs to the operating
firms and causes sluggishness in the labor adjustment process, evolve to have inefficient
outcomes on several economic dimensions. For instance, Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
find that high firing costs imply “slower and more uncertain growth” and Heckman
(2002) finds that “incentives to innovate, to acquire skills, and to take risks have been
thwarted by the welfare state”. Section 2 provides an overview and the theoretical
framework of the consequences of adjustment costs. Section 3 contains a brief summary
2The European economic-disease where poor job creation dynamics appear as symptoms of
employment-protectionist policies.
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of the Portuguese labor market’s statistics. Section 4 sets out the estimation procedure
to assess the level of sluggishness. Section 5 describes the dataset used and the results
obtained. And Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Factor Demand and Adjustment Costs
Firms’ demand for inputs depends primarily on the level of economic activity, i.e., on
the business cycle. During an expansion firms would like to hire inputs so as to face
the increased demand by consumers for their products or services, whereas during a
downturn firms would like to cut back on input usage to avoid wasting resources, which
ultimately lead to inefficient outcomes. Consider the two main inputs in the production
function: capital and labor. Capital is usually assumed to be fixed in the short-run,
this meaning that firms do not adjust their capital input instantaneously (following
a shock to aggregate demand, for instance). One of the reasons is that it may be
physically impossible, as is in the case of industrial firms, where capital is usually in
the form of heavy machinery and buildings which take time to build and to set up. This
can be viewed as a friction in capital adjustment that prevents an immediate response
following a shock. To face this short-run rigidity firms can, alternatively, adjust less
rigid inputs provided there is a degree of substitutability between them, and labor is a
candidate for just that. So, in general, we assume capital to be a fixed factor and labor
to be a variable factor, in the short-run. Following Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), we
will concentrate not on the physical impossibility explanation for sluggishness in input
adjustment, but on adjustment costs. First, because for labor we cannot usually rely
on the first explanation to justify rigidities; and second, because it can be viewed as
a generalization, since physical restrictions also imply a cost: the opportunity cost of
time. The existence of adjustment costs implies that firms may not adjust factor inputs
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immediately after a shock (or may not adjust at all). Although this can be due to
shortsightedness or myopia by the firms, we can not in general discard the possibility
that it may be a rational decision. Suppose firms expect (correctly) that a current
positive aggregate demand shock will last for only two periods. If the adjustment
process takes one period and is costly, then it may be optimal to not adjust at all, if
adjustment costs overweight the expected net benefits of making the adjustment and
reverting it.
2.1 Typology of adjustment costs
For the factor input labor the essential distinction for our discussion of the topic of
adjustment costs is among fixed costs, those unaffected by the quantity of adjustment
in the labor input (provided that is an adjustment); and variable costs, those directly
dependent on the size of the adjustment. If we now think that labor can actually take
the form of either workers hired or hours hired by the firms, there is the possibility of
substituting one for the other if they do not entail the same adjustment cost structure.
In practice, we can think of a variety of labor adjustment costs for both worker- and
hour-adjustments. In any hiring process there is always the screening cost of selecting a
new worker which involve advertisement of job vacancies, tests and interview sessions,
administrative costs and on-job training of newly hired workers. Additionally, new
hires will possibly hinder temporarily the efficiency level during the adjustment phase;
possibly, some costs related to the readjustment of the production process will also arise.
Contrarily to other input factors, however, there are additional costs if the company
decides to part with an employee. Often legislation obliges firms to severance pay
in case of separation. Besides, the sole act to firing a worker implies a great deal of
administrative and efficiency-loss costs. All these costs suggest that costs are inherent
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to the process of hiring and firing a worker, not just to changes in the size of the
workforce. Hiring an extra hour of work from an existing worker entails a considerable
lower diversity of costs. Although firms are obliged to pay overtime wages (equal to the
base wage rate plus a premium) and all the costs that are dependent on the number
hours of work, they may be able to avoid a significant amount of costs, especially
separation costs. This suggests that there may be differences on balance between the
employment of workers and the dependence on extra-time hours of work, and that this
balance is a function of the cost structure of each type of labor.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Let us now examine how the presence of adjustment costs might influence firms’ de-
cisions. Hamermesh (1993) provides a thorough survey on dynamics of labor demand
and adjustment cost. To understand the impact of adjustment costs on adjustment dy-
namics, we must analyze firms’ decisions. Consider a representative profit-maximizing
firm with profits given by
Π =
ˆ ∞
0
e−rt
{
F (Lt)− wtLt − C
(
L̇t
)}
dt. (1)
We assume firms have a production function F which depends only on labor, Lt; they
face a cost function C which depends on the size of the adjustment, L̇t; and they
face exogenous wage rate w and discount rate r. Firms will then maximize, at each
period in time, the discounted future net value of their production. Since we are
interested in studying the effects of labor adjustment costs, which will enter the firms’
maximization problem through the cost function, we will bypass the problems related to
the determination of wages and interest rates here. What can we expect from this firm’s
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behavior in the presence of adjustment costs? As for most typical economic problems,
and this one is no exception, it depends. Considering the forward-looking nature of
this optimization problem, the labor adjustment pattern following a shock should be
fundamentally determined by the functional form of C and by other factors such as the
firm’s expectations about the size and duration of the shock. Let us consider the two
main categories of adjustment costs: variable costs and fixed/lumpy costs under static
expectations.3 If we consider symmetric quadratic variable costs,
C
(
L̇t
)
= a
∣∣∣L̇t∣∣∣+ bL̇t2 (2)
with a, b > 0 what we would expect is a slow, lagged adjustment towards the equilibrium
level of employment following an unexpected shock. To see this, observe the general
functional form of the cost function, which tells us that the cost of making an adjustment
L̇t rises quadratically with the level of the adjustment. For the firm, this means that
large adjustments are disproportionately expensive and so, when facing the trade-off
slow adjustment (maintaining a gap relatively to the optimum level of employment for
many periods, which is inefficient, but a low cost of adjustment per period) versus fast
adjustment (few gap-periods but a high cost of adjustment per period) the firm will
spread out the adjustment across several periods. How spread out the adjustment is will
depend ultimately on the size of the parameters a and b. Also, following an unexpected
shock, firms will only start the adjustment a period after it occurs (remember firms’
expectations are static). Hence we have a slow and lagged adjustment. A special case
can be obtained if b = 0. In that case, the firm faces a linear adjustment cost function
and the optimal behavior is to adjust immediately and fully, so as to minimize the losses
3Firms’ expectation for all future equilibrium levels of employment, Lt+1, is simply its last observed
value. More formally, Et
[
L∗t+j
]
= L∗t for all t and all j > 0.
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generated by an off-equilibrium situation. If we consider fixed costs,
C
(
L̇t
)
=

k ,
∣∣∣L̇t∣∣∣ > 0
0 ,
∣∣∣L̇t∣∣∣ = 0 (3)
with k > 0 what we would expect is a step-like, lagged adjustment towards the equi-
librium. Again, a firm has to weight the net benefits of a fast adjustment against the
net benefits of a slow adjustment. In this case, the firm faces a cost k if it decides to
adjust, regardless of the size of the adjustment, and no cost otherwise. Given this cost
function, the firm will choose either to adjust fully or not adjust at all. Since the cost
incurred is independent of the level of adjustment, if the firm is going to adjust it might
as well adjust completely to equilibrium so as to minimize inefficiencies. From this it
follows that, for a given k, there is a threshold level of adjustment that leads the firm to
make the adjustment. This is of course a function of the severity of adjustment costs,
and the expected long-term net benefits of an immediate adjustment. In the end, this
means that firms will be willing to accommodate with an ’inefficient’ outcome if the
costs of adjustment are sufficiently high and/or the necessary adjustment to equilib-
rium is small (i.e., inefficiency losses are small). Notice that we can compare both these
cases with the trivial case of no adjustment costs, efficiency-wise. In the later, where
C
(
L̇t
)
= 0 for all levels of L̇. Adjustment is not costly, which means that the optimal
response is always to adjust fully and immediately to equilibrium after a shock. In the
former cases, where some form of adjustment cost is present, the optimal decision will
possibly imply a partial adjustment through time, imposing a loss of efficiency at the
level of the firm. Of course, in reality the structure of adjustment costs that firms face
should be a combination of these two extreme cases, that is, most adjustment processes
will entail a component of variable costs and a component of fixed costs. As such, we
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should expect a firm’s adjustment process to lie somewhere in between the two cases
described above, i.e., we should observe no adjustment for small changes in the equi-
librium level of employment (due to lumpy costs) and smooth adjustment for changes
in equilibrium that are higher than the threshold level (due to quadratic costs). With
significant labor adjustment costs, labor will be sticky and it can be said that labor
is a quasi-fixed input. Evidence shows that labor adjustments costs are indeed quite
significant. Hamermesh (1993) reviews the significance of these costs. A survey in 1980
for Los Angeles documents average hiring and training costs of $5110 for production
workers and $13790 for salaried workers, while firing separation costs are around $370
and $1780, respectively. More recently, Abowd and Kramarz (2003) estimated the an-
nual adjustment costs of replacing a worker, by age group and job type, with results
ranging from 2.8% to 9.7% of total annual compensation.
2.3 Consequences
The fact that hiring and separation costs exist will impact negatively on adjustment
dynamics not only during a downturn (when a firm would like to lay off workers),
but also during an expansionary phase (when a firm would like to hire more workers).
On the one hand, firms will not adjust fast during a recession. They will employ a
higher labor force than the necessary and bear some inefficiency costs. On the other
hand, if firms are forward-looking, they will anticipate the costs faced with separations,
and will refrain from increasing employment during expansions as well. Therefore,
adjustment costs and a strict labor law impose costs at all states of the business cycle.
Because firms cannot resize downwards they will be contained in their expansions as
well. This (rational) firm behavior will imply a gap between the optimal workforce and
the one observed at each moment in time. The result is that this gap will be increasing
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with adjustment costs. The intuition is that a higher level of adjustment costs will
shift firms’ incentives towards a choice of a smaller workforce relatively to the optimal
level, thus implying a higher inefficiency level. This happens because the net benefits
of hiring an additional worker shrink in the presence of adjustment costs. The final
outcome is not only bad news for employment, but bad news for economic growth as
well. Another perverse effect of sizable adjustments costs comes through the weakened
matching opportunities. In a rigid labor market where direct and indirect hiring and
firing costs are high, worker flows are small. This pleases the employed, but should also
worry them, as were they to become unemployed new job prospects would be scarce.
Worse than this is the fact that the whole economy could benefit, maintaining the same
people employed and unemployed, by simply reallocating them to more appropriate
jobs - creating better matches. Rigidities actually work to make firms not willing to fire
misplaced workers (bad matches) and workers not willing to quit firms where they are
not happy and most productive (bad matches as well). Efficiency is evidently severed.
3 The Portuguese Labor Market
A number of studies have ranked Portugal among the countries with highest level of
employment protection. For instance, the OECD reports some employment protection
indicators for OECD countries. The analysis of Table 1 shows that Portugal has con-
sistently ranked among the most protectionist countries in the OECD. The situation
is specially serious in the regular employment category where Portugal has ranked first
in 1998 and 2008, this meaning that, besides the very rigid labor market we inherited
from previous generations, no effective changes were made - or they did not work out
as expected - during this 10-year period for this particular branch of the labor market.
Regarding temporary employment and collective dismissals, rigidity levels are less seri-
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ous and improvements are visible. Overall, there has been an improvement in flexibility
since 1998, showed by the overall strictness index. Still, as of 2008, Portugal remains
well above the OECD average. Worker flows provide another sign of rigidities in the
Portuguese labor market. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) document the worker flows
and job creation and destruction for Portugal and the United States. Table 2 is a par-
tial reproduction of the authors’ Tables 6 and 7. We can clearly observe, analyzing the
first four columns, a higher flexibility of the American market, with larger flows and
higher job creation and destruction dynamics. The remaining three columns show the
worker flows from employment to (i) unemployment (ii) non-activity (iii) employment.
Again, flows in the Portuguese labor market are smaller (on average 1/3) than those
of the United States. More recent indicators are also available. Figure 1 presents the
quarterly labor market flows between employment , unemployment and inactivity for
Portugal in 2010. In a given quarter, on average, none of the flows exceeded 1.5% of
active population, which again illustrates the slow dynamics of the Portuguese labor
market. Table 3 presents some statistics on duration of employment and unemployment
and incidence of long-term employment and unemployment for the period 2001-2010.
The duration of both employment and unemployment has been increasing for this pe-
riod which once more argues in favor of a sclerotic market: employed people tend to
keep their jobs for a long time and unemployed have a hard time finding a job, since
few vacancies are made available. Although more volatile, the long-term unemployment
has risen from 42% to 56%, quite startling figures.
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4 Econometric Model
4.1 Model Specification
The empirical analysis conducted here aims at shedding some light on the dynamics of
labor adjustment. What we seek is a measure of how sluggish employment adjustment
is. Consider the extension of the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model to panel data
yit = αyi,t−1+x′itβ + εit (4)
εit = ui + vit (5)
where the subscript i = 1, 2, ..., N designates firms and the subscript t = 1, 2, ..., T
designates time. For each firm i, yit[T×1] is a column vector containing the realiza-
tions of the dependent variable; x′it[T×k] is matrix containing the information of the
k explanatory variables; α and β
[k×1] are parameters to be estimated; and εit[T×1] is a
column vector of error terms, containing a firm-specific and time-independent effect
(fixed effect), ui, and an idiosyncratic shock (random effect), vit. Also, we assume
E [ui] = E [vit] = E [uivit] = 0 (the firm-specific and idiosyncratic error terms have
mean zero and are orthogonal) and E [vitvjt] = 0 for i 6= j (the idiosyncratic error
terms are orthogonal across firms).
An application to the employment equation is directly obtained by allowing the depen-
dent variable to be a measure of employment, such as the number of workers or hours
worked, and including other explanatory variables such as the demand for the firms’
products and the wages. This gives us a parsimonious representation of the dynamics of
the labor demand as well as a measure of the adjustment speed, through the coefficient
α. The model can of course be augmented with lags of the explanatory variables and
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further lags of the dependent variable. We can think of the adjustment process as given
by a Partial Adjustment model in discrete time. With static expectations
4Lt = δ
[
L∗t−1 − Lt−1
]
(6)
where L∗ is the equilibrium employment level. Changes that affect L∗ will trigger an
adjustment process of L towards the new equilibrium level. The process will be slower
the more severe the adjustment costs, as explained earlier. The parameter δ moderates
the adjustment in each period, which is given by a fraction of the distance to the
equilibrium level. A lower δ implies a lower adjustment speed, hence a higher rigidity
level. The interpretations via α or δ are qualitatively symmetrical since α is a rigidity
parameter (high for slow adjustment) whereas δ is a flexibility parameter (high for fast
adjustment).
4.2 Estimation
Estimation of the model proposed above requires the use of nonstandard procedures.
Several remarks can be made regarding the nature of the model. (i) in the presence
of fixed effects (unobservable firm-specific characteristics that imply different responses
for each firm) we can no longer make use of the standard OLS estimation procedures
(which deliver downward-biased coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable,
an effect known as dynamic panel bias or Nickell bias)4, since these unobserved effects
may be correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables in xit leading to
endogeneity. If that is the case, OLS would produce biased and inconsistent estimates;
(ii) another type of endogeneity - simultaneity - may also be present, if explanatory
variables are not strictly exogenous, but predetermined by their past values, they will
4Nickell (1981).
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be correlated with past error terms. This renders the same estimation problems as
the first point; (iii) the random component of the error term may be heteroskedastic,
showing different patterns for different firms. This is a less serious problem, affecting
only efficiency and not consistency, but still corrections may be necessary for valid
inference purposes.
Even though the problems of this type of model seem overwhelming, solutions have been
designed to overcome them. As typical for models plagued with endogenous variables,
instrumentation offers a promising way out. The joint contributions of Arellano, Bond,
Bover and Blundell provide the econometric framework necessary to address these same
concerns in the contexts of dynamic panel data models. They have proposed two
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The first one by Arellano and
Bond (1991), called Difference GMM ; and the second one by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998), called System GMM. The Difference GMM estimator
transforms equations (4) and (5) by using first differences of variables to eradicate fixed
effects from the model (remember that fixed effects are time-independent - they vary
only across firms - thus disappear in first differences) under the assumption of serially
uncorrelated errors. System GMM uses instrumental variables to overcome the same
problem and relies on a two-equation model (the original level equation and a differenced
equation). In both cases, we will eventually have to deal with endogenous variables
(whether or not correlated with fixed effects), hence instrumental variables are bound
to enter the picture. However, given the statistical importance of good instruments and
the typical data availability problems of empirical studies, the immediate solution itself
raises another concern. The methods applied here actually resolve the main problems
present in this type of analysis. By using lags of the regressors as instruments for the
regressors themselves, and estimating a model in first-differences, we can overcome both
types of endogeneity without the need for ’outsider’ instruments. Both procedures are
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designed (i.e., best suitable) for panels with a large number of firms and a small number
of time periods (large N , small T ), compactible with our dataset to be described further
ahead. Corrections are also available to solve heteroskedasticity, based on two-step
estimates that are asymptotically consistent.
With large datasets the number of potential instruments becomes very large. We might
be tempted make use several lags to instrument each variable (under the principle
that more information is always beneficial) but this turns out not to be so simple.
The system that produces the parameter estimates is usually overidentified (with more
instrument than endogenous variables) and postestimation procedures should be used
to check the validity of the instruments used. As noted in the literature, if the matter
of proliferation of instruments is not attended to, significant bias is to be expected
in parameter estimates (overfitting bias) and test statistics (commonly the Sargan or
Hansen’s J statistics, used to validate instruments used) that rely on estimated standard
errors that perform poorly under overproliferation of instruments5. Windmeijer (2005)
suggests a correction to the traditional two-step standard errors that performs very
well in simulations, making them asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. We thus
shall refrain from using the Sargan test which is a special case of Hansen’s J statistic
not robust to heteroskedasticity; we shall apply the Windmeijer correction whenever
appropriate; and we shall keep the instrument count in check. A bold rule-of-thumb is
to keep the number of instruments well below the number of groups (in this case firms)
in the sample.
5e.g.: Tauchen (1986), Windmeijer (2005) and Roodman (2009a).
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5 Data and Results
The complete dataset (IVNEI) is composed of a panel spanning 11 years (1995-2005) of
monthly data for 3887 firms (large N , small T ). For some of these firms information is
not available for all years, which leaves us with a total of 345965 observations. Firms are
identified by a fiscal number (npc) and an industry-sector number (cae). The dataset
provides monthly information on the total number of workers (n), total number of
hours worked (h), firm sales (s), total wages (wn) and wages per worker (w). For
computational reasons, we shall restrict the sample by using only firms belonging to
traditional transforming industry (coded with a cae number between 10,000 and 19,999).
A number of studies have been carried on. For European countries, Abraham and
Houseman (1999) has applied a generalized Koyck model to the same problem, using
data on workers and hours for several manufacturing sectors in Germany, France, Bel-
gium and the United States, but disregarded the problem of endogeneity altogether.
Such is a case with a number of other studies. In the source papers of on-set GMM
instrumentation Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundel and Bond (1998) provide not
only the theory but also applications for their methods using annual microeconomic firm
data for the United Kingdom. We start by reproducing the methodology of Arellano
and Bond (1991) for Portugal. After annualizing our dataset, the model in equation (4)
is estimated through Difference GMM, assuming the explanatory variables to be strictly
exogenous, except for the lagged dependent variable which is taken to be endogenous
(thus instrumented via GMM procedures with own past lags). Results are given in Ta-
ble (4). Columns labeled (1) and (2) provide one-step and two-step estimates using the
number of workers as a measure of employment, which are directly comparable with
the estimates from columns (a1) and (a2) of Table 4 in Arellano and Bond (1991), the
only difference being the fact that we do not include capital in the equation (as it is not
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available in our dataset). We observe a first-lag coefficient of 0.827 and 0.753 for models
(1) and (2), respectively. These contrast with Arellano and Bond’s 0.686 and 0.629.
As expected, Portugal shows a higher first-order autoregressive coefficient implying a
higher level of rigidity (the second-order coefficient is small and not statistically signif-
icant for both studies). The two models provide very similar coefficients, with two-step
estimates lower in absolute value than one-step estimates expect for wit. Two-step
estimates are more precise as given by standard errors. Columns (3) and (4) display
the same results but using hours, rather than workers, as a measure of employment.
Estimates of the main parameter of interest, 0.791 and 0.767, are only slightly lower
than the estimates for workers. Abraham and Houseman (1999) also find this effect,
but with larger differences between the adjustment in workers and hours. Regarding
the explanatory variables, we can measure the short-run (or impact) elasticities given
by the contemporaneous impact of xit on yit, ∂yit∂xit , and the long-run elasticities given
by the corresponding cumulative effect, i.e., the impact of xit on the equilibrium level
of yit,
∑∞
j=0
∂yit
∂xi,t−j
. For sales these elasticities have the expect sign with the short-run
elasticity varying between 0.228 and 0.246 and the long-run elasticity between 0.677
and 0.738. For wages, short-run elasticities have very small coefficients and even a pos-
itive coefficient in model (3) while long-run elasticities vary between 0.132 and 0.851,
which goes completely against economic theory. These positive elasticities and their
wide variability suggest that treating wages as exogenous is incorrect.
Although test statistics for overidentifying restrictions and exogeneity of instruments
turn out favorable, we should be uncomfortable with the assumption of strictly ex-
ogenous sales and wages, especially given the senseless results for wages. For the
explanatory variables with more than one lag, the more recent lags are, at least in
part, determined by the older lags, rendering these variable predetermined and, there-
fore, not strictly exogenous. Besides this, economic theory alone provides sufficient
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reasoning to suspect that employment, wages and sales are jointly determined, yielding
unsatisfactory the assumption of strict exogeneity. Table 5 reports the results of endo-
genizing wages and sales. A decrease in the rigidity parameter is more prominent for
hours, although also present for workers, with hours showing lower rigidity, although
only slightly. Precision, however, is significantly improved as shown by the lower stan-
dard errors. Short-run elasticities of sales are increased in all models (varying between
0.256 and 0.342) and long-run elasticities in all but the second model (varying between
0.694 and 0.838). Short-run elasticities of wages have the expected sign but are still
small, whereas long-run elasticities for the models using the number of workers remain
positive.
Next, we exploit the System GMM estimator. Allowing for a larger system, it also
allows for a larger number of instruments to be used (past levels and past differences).
A parsimonious model is estimated in two frequencies: annual and quarterly, presented
in Table 6. For the number of workers, the autoregressive coefficient ranges from 0.870
in yearly frequency to 0.921 in quarterly frequency. Using hours, these range from 0.857
to 913. Notice the number of hours worked seems to be more flexible than the number
of workers (for both frequencies), although, once again, just slightly. Second, validity
tests are favorable for the annual specification, although they seem to breakdown in
the quarterly model, as a result of the large number of instruments used (about 27%
the number of groups). All elasticities have the expected signs. Using annual data,
short-run elasticities of sales/wages are 0.464/-0.416 for the number of workers and
0.511/-0.456 for the number of hours, respectively, comparable to Blundel and Bond’s
(1998) estimates from a similar model (using annual data, for the number of workers
but replacing sales with capital), where they find a short-run elasticity of wages equal
to -0.797 and a sluggishness parameter equal to 0.810. Using quarterly data, elasticities
of sales/wages become 0.100/-0.042 for the number of workers and 0.129/-0.204 for the
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number of hours.
6 Conclusions
The annual-frequency System GMM model of Table 6 delivers the most trustful results
with all coefficients having the appropriate sign and all tests providing evidence in
support of the validity of the instruments used. For the number of workers we find
an autoregressive parameter equal to 0.870 and long-run elasticities of 0.89 and -1.48
for sales and wages, respectively. Blundel and Bond (1998) find an autoregressive
parameter of 0.810 and a long-run elasticity of wages equal to -1.307 for the UK. We
can also have a temporal measure of these levels of rigidity via the median adjustment
lag, the time it takes the system to adjust halfway to a new equilibrium in response
to a shock. Our results imply a 4- and 3.5-year period for 50% of the adjustment in
workers and hours to take place, respectively. This compares with the 2.3 years for
the number of workers in the UK (Blundel and Bond (1998)) and 1.9, 3.1, 1.6 and
0.4 years for the number of workers in Germany, France, Belgium and United States,
respectively, and 1.3, 2,1 and 0.3 years for the number of hours in Germany, France
and United States (Abraham and Houseman (1999)). Contrarily to what we could
initially expect, adjustmebt in the number of workers and the number of hours does
not differ considerably. One reason could be that the overtime premium for extra hours
is sufficiently high so that firms do not have strong incentives to substitute hours for
workers. Still, our main conjecture stands: adjustment dynamics in the Portuguese
labor market are very slow, implying a range of structural problems typical of countries
with a sclerotic labor market.
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Appendix
Table 1: Synthetic Indicators of Employment Protection
Overall
strictness
Strictness:
regular
employment
Strictness:
temporary
employment
Strictness:
collective
dismissals
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
1.5
2.4
2.5
1.1
1.9
2.2
2.8
2.6
3.5
1.5
-
1.2
3.1
1.6
2.0
-
3.2
2.8
0.8
2.7
1.9
3.5
3.0
2.5
1.6
3.4
1.0
0.7
1.4
2.2
2.5
1.1
1.8
2.0
2.9
2.4
2.8
1.9
1.6
1.3
2.4
1.5
1.9
2.3
3.2
2.1
1.2
2.7
2.2
2.9
3.0
2.2
1.6
3.5
1.1
0.7
1.5
2.9
1.7
1.3
1.6
2.3
2.3
2.7
2.3
1.9
-
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.4
-
2.3
3.1
1.4
2.3
2.1
4.3
2.6
2.9
1.2
2.6
1.0
0.2
1.4
2.4
1.7
1.3
1.6
2.2
2.5
3.0
2.3
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.4
2.8
2.3
2.7
1.6
2.3
2.1
4.2
2.5
2.9
1.2
2.6
1.1
0.2
0.9
1.5
2.6
0.3
1.4
1.9
3.6
2.0
4.8
0.6
-
0.3
3.6
1.4
1.7
-
4.0
2.4
0.4
3.1
0.8
3.0
3.3
1.6
1.1
4.9
0.3
0.3
0.9
1.5
2.6
0.3
1.4
1.8
3.6
1.3
3.1
1.4
0.6
0.6
2.0
1.0
1.4
3.8
4.0
1.2
1.3
3.1
1.8
2.1
3.5
0.9
1.1
4.9
0.4
0.3
2.9
3.3
4.1
2.6
3.9
2.6
2.1
3.8
3.3
2.9
-
2.4
4.9
1.5
1.9
-
3.8
3.0
0.4
2.9
4.1
2.9
3.1
3.8
3.9
1.6
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.3
4.1
2.6
3.1
2.4
2.1
3.8
3.3
2.9
3.5
2.4
4.9
1.5
1.9
3.9
3.8
3.0
0.4
2.9
3.6
1.9
3.1
3.8
3.9
2.4
2.9
2.9
OECD Total
Portugal Ranking
2.2
1st
2.1
5th
2.1
1st
2.1
1st
1.9
8th
1.8
10th
3.0
14th
3.0
28th
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2010
Table 2: Quarterly worker flows from employment, job creation and job destruction
Workers
Out
Workers
In
Job
Destruction
Job
Creation E to U E to N E to E
Portugal
United States
4.3
17.8-23
3.6
16.7-21.9
3.0
7.9
2.3
5.1
1.0
3.9
1.0
4.8
1.0
2.4-5.4
Notes: Partial reproduction of Tables 6 and 7 in Blanchard and Portugal (1998). In the last 3 columns,
E=Employment, U=Unemployment and N=Inactivity. All values are percentages of employment.
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Figure 1: Average quarterly flows in the Portuguese labor market
Notes: Values in thousands (% of active population). Source: Relatório Anual 2010, Banco de Portugal;
Table 3: Work Mobility
Employment Unemployment
Average
Duration(a)
Long-term
Employment(b)
Average
Duration(a)
Long-term
Unemployment(c)
2001 118 45 18 42
2002 119 45 18 38
2003 123 45 16 39
2004 126 46 20 48
2005 129 47 21 51
2006 128 45 23 53
2007 126 43 22 50
2008 125 43 23 51
2009 129 44 22 48
2010 130 44 25 56
(a) in months; (b) % of workers older than 45 and with more than 20 years of tenure;(c) % of
unemployed that have been looking for a job for more than 12 months. Source: INE (Inquérito ao
Emprego)
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Table 4: Employment equation (Difference GMM, exogenous explanatory variables, annual data)
Dependent Var: eit = nit Dependent Var: eit = hit
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ei,t−1
ei,t−2
sit
si,t−1
si,t−2
wit
wi,t−1
0.827 (0.167)
-0.060 (0.037)
0.230 (0.045)
-0.058 (0.044)
0.008 (0.021)
-0.017 (0.100)
0.130 (0.064)
0.753 (0.083)
-0.029 (0.024)
0.228 (0.026)
-0.031 (0.026)
-0.008 (0.016)
-0.055 (0.050)
0.101 (0.036)
0.791 (0.207)
-0.013 (0.036)
0.246 (0.088)
-0.087 (0.063)
-0.001 (0.026)
0.107 (0.192)
0.082 (0.086)
0.767 (0.080)
-0.024 (0.023)
0.244 (0.032)
-0.070 (0.030)
0.007 (0.017)
-0.003 (0.063)
0.037 (0.039)
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano-Bond AR(1)
Arellano-Bond AR(2)
Overidentifying Restrictions
Hansen J
Exogeneity of Instrument
Hansen
Difference in Hansen
0.000
0.302
0.374 (55)
0.342 (49)
0.479 (13)
0.000
0.069
0.374 (55)
0.342 (49)
0.479 (13)
0.000
0.105
0.695 (55)
0.826 (42)
0.259 (13)
0.000
0.184
0.695 (55)
0.826 (42)
0.259 (13)
Observations/Groups
Instruments
6506/1313
70
6506/1313
70
6506/1313
70
6506/1313
70
Notes: (i) GMM-type instruments used for lagged dependent variables and IV-type instruments for remaining variables
(ii) Columns (1) and (2) represent robust one-step and two-step estimates using workers (n). Columns (3) and (4)
represent the same for hours (h). Standard errors in parentheses (iii) All variables are in logs (iv) Time dummies were
included (v) Tests shown are P-values (d.f.). Higher is better.
Table 5: Employment equation (Difference GMM, endogenous explanatory variables, annual data)
Dependent Var: eit = nit Dependent Var: eit = hit
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ei,t−1
ei,t−2
sit
si,t−1
si,t−2
wit
wi,t−1
0.796 (0.079)
-0.055 (0.034)
0.267 (0.062)
-0.050 (0.028)
0.018 (0.017)
-0.102 (0.081)
0.111 (0.041)
0.730 (0.029)
-0.057 (0.014)
0.256 (0.016)
-0.029 (0.012)
0.008 (0.007)
-0.066 (0.027)
0.088 (0.017)
0.639 (0.075)
-0.009 (0.033)
0.342 (0.083)
-0.041 (0.029)
0.022 (0.018)
-0.074 (0.142)
0.020 (0.054)
0.598 (0.030)
-0.010 (0.014)
0.329 (0.015)
-0.026 (0.012)
0.012 (0.008)
-0.033 (0.032)
0.022 (0.018)
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano-Bond AR(1)
Arellano-Bond AR(2)
Overidentifying Restrictions
Hansen J
Exogeneity of Instrument
Hansen
Difference in Hansen
0.000
0.412
0.225 (166)
0.129 (158)
0.997 (8)
0.000
0.323
0.225 (166)
0.129 (158)
0.997 (8)
0.000
0.093
0.334 (166)
0.289 (158)
0.661 (8)
0.000
0.062
0.334 (166)
0.289 (158)
0.661 (8)
Observations/Groups
Instruments
6506/1313
181
6506/1313
181
6506/1313
181
6506/1313
181
Notes: (i) GMM instruments used for all variables. Notes (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) from Table (4) apply.
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Table 6: Employment equation (System GMM, endogenous explanatory variables)
Dependent Var: eit Annual Quarterly
Independent Variables (1)
eit = nit
(2)
eit = hit
(3)
eit = nit
(4)
eit = hit
ei,t−1
sit
si,t−1
wit
wi,t−1
0.870 (0.030)
0.464 (0.095)
-0.338 (0.108)
-0.416 (0.106)
0.223 (0.123)
0.857 (0.038)
0.511 (0.087)
-0.377 (0.099)
-0.456 (0.100)
0.252 (0.120)
0.921 (0.026)
0.100 (0.038)
-0.058 (0.025)
-0.042 (0.054)
0.021 (0.037)
0.913 (0.218)
0.129 (0.043)
-0.075 (0.033)
-0.204 (0.044)
0.152 (0.037)
Median Adjustment Lag(a)
Long-run Elasticities
sales
wages
4.0
0.89
-1.48
3.5
0.94
-1.43
1.8
0.53
-0.27
1.6
0.62
-0.60
Autocorrelation in FD
Arellano-Bond AR(1)
Arellano-Bond AR(2)
Overidentifying Restrictions
Hansen J
Exogeneity of Instruments
Hansen
levels
ei,t−1
sit
si,t−1
wit
wi,t−1
Difference in Hansen
levels
ei,t−1
sit
si,t−1
wit
wi,t−1
0.000
0.785
0.240 (59)
0.291 (21)
0.274 (56)
0.300 (44)
0.051 (44)
0.087 (43)
0.230 (44)
0.292 (38)
0.222 (03)
0.268 (15)
0.981 (15)
0.856 (16)
0.400 (15)
0.000
0.502
0.325 (59)
0.176 (21)
0.269 (56)
0.312 (44)
0.159 (44)
0.152 (43)
0.184 (44)
0.538 (38)
0.724 (03)
0.428 (15)
0.814 (15)
0.815 (16)
0.745 (15)
0.000
0.565
0.002 (369)
0.003 (178)
0.001 (314)
0.004 (289)
0.002 (289)
0.003 (289)
0.012 (290)
0.077 (191)
0.338 (55)
0.075 (80)
0.172 (80)
0.112 (80)
0.019 (79)
0.000
0.000
0.000 (369)
0.000 (178)
0.000 (314)
0.000 (289)
0.000 (289)
0.000 (289)
0.000 (290)
0.042 (191)
0.228 (55)
0.022 (80)
0.641 (80)
0.056 (80)
0.788 (79)
Observations/Groups
Instruments
9360/1454
74
9359/1454
74
41168/1534
417
41153/1534
417
Notes: (i) GMM-type instruments used for all variables (ii) Columns (1) and (2) represent robust two-step estimates
using workers (n) and hours (h), respectively, for annual data. Columns (3) and (4) represent the same for quarterly
data. Windmeijer robust standard errors in parentheses. Notes (iii), (iv) and (v) from Table (4) apply. (a) in years.
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